论道德金规则的最佳可能方案
出处:论文网
时间:2006-05-28
[i] 我曾经提出这个“接受问题”去批评哈贝马斯。参见赵汀阳:Understanding & Acceptance. In Les Assises de la Connaissance Reciproque, Le Robert, Paris, 2003.
[ii] Levinas: Ethics as First Philosophy, in The Levinas Reader, ed. S. Hand, Blackwell, 1989.
[iii] Carl Schmitt: The Concept of Political. The Univ. of Chicago Pr., 1996.
[iv] 孔汉思/库舍尔:《全球伦理:世界宗教议会宣言》。四川人民出版社,1997。
[v] Kant:Groundwork of Metaphysics of Morals. Harper & Row, New York, 1964. Section II.
[vi] cf. Henry Sidgwick: The Methods of Ethics. Macmillan, 1890, p.380.
[vii] 王庆节:《解释学、海德格尔与儒道今释》。见“道德金律与普世伦理的可能性”。中国人民大学出版社,2004。
[viii] 一般情况是,看到别人经济上比较成功,有些人会嫉妒而痛苦,这样虽然不好,却不算变态。也许有的人看到别人幸福也感到痛苦,这就是变态了,因为背后是完全扭曲的、反对任何人的极端心理。这些变态的情况是心理学的课题,伦理学不考虑在内,所以不能构成反例。
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论道德金规则的最佳可能方案
On the Best Possible Golden Rule
关键词:道德金规则,主体观点,他者观点,公正,对等性
Key words: Golden Rule, Subjectivity, Other-ness, Reciprocity
提要:
道德金规则是伦理学中公正原理的一个浓缩表达。本文分析了传统的道德金规则的典型民间版本和学术版本,指出传统金规则要得以成立,在逻辑上至少需要两个条件:人际共识和价值共识。而在今天,价值共识已经不存在,所以传统金规则不再成立。作者试图通过从“主体观点”到“他者观点”的转换而提出一个关于道德金规则的新版本,即以“人所不欲,勿施于人”代替“己所不欲,勿施于人”,并试图论证其逻辑上的完美性。本文中的核心论点最早于2000年提出,由于该问题涉及到生活基本准则,事关重大,因此经过听取多方意见和反思,在这里进行了更严格的论证和修改。
The moral golden rule is generally supposed a representation of the principle of justice. A careful analysis is given in this paper to show the logical limitation of the traditional golden rule. It says that one of the two necessary conditions for the traditional golden rule is missing today. And the author gives his claimed perfect representation of the golden rule as that never do to others whatever others would not like you to do to them instead of the traditional as that never do to others whatever you would not like others to do to you, argued from the principle of the Other-ness rather than the Subjectivity.